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Spinoza’s law
The epicurean definition of the law in the Theological
Political Treatise
Dimitris Vardoulakis
In the first few pages of chapter 4 of his Theological Polit-
ical Treatise (1670), Spinoza defines his conception of
the law.1 In fact, he defines the law twice, first in terms
of compulsion or necessity and then in terms of use. I
would like to investigate here these definitions, in par-
ticular the second one, as it is Spinoza’s preferred one.
The difficulty with understanding this definition is that it
contains an expression, ratio vivendi, that is repeated sev-
eral times in the first few pages of chapter 4, but, unless
it is taken as a technical term referring to law as use, it is
easy to mistake it as a casual expression that might mean
different things each time. As a result, it is indispensable
to turn to the Latin text to unlock the technical meaning
of ratio vivendi.
This holds a few surprises. First, there is a historical
surprise. Spinoza’s definition of the law according to its
use is typical of the epicurean understanding of the law.
This suggests that his account of the law is aligned with
the epicurean tradition.2 Moreover, it raises the ques-
tion of why this epicurean conception of legality has not
been noted in jurisprudence. Second, Spinoza’s concep-
tion of the law has the potential to make an intervention
in contemporary definitions of legality, since it avoids
both decisionism and positivism. Law defined as use can
allow neither of exceptionalism nor of a conception of
unalloyed legality that remains immune from social and
political influences.
An important inference will follow these considera-
tions: when law is determined through its use, any law is
invalidated or delegitimated by the mere fact that it does
not contribute to the well-being of the community. This
has a radical political potential that I will touch upon
by way of conclusion. Spinoza’s epicurean conception
of the law will turn out to be of contemporary political
relevance.
The two definitions of the law
The opening couple of sentences of chapter 4 of the Theo-
logical Political Treatise define the law in the course of
drawing a distinction between divine and human law:
The word law, taken in its absolute sense [legis nomen
absolute], means that according to which each individual
thing – either all in general or those of the same kind –
acts in one and the same fixed and determinate manner,
this manner depending either on Nature’s necessity or on
human will. A law which depends on Nature’s necessity
is one which necessarily follows from the very nature of
the thing, that is, its definition; a law which depends on
human will, and which could more properly be termed a
statute [jus], is one which men ordain for themselves and
for others with view to making life more secure and more
convenient [ad tutius, et commodius vivendum]. (48/57)
It is striking what is elided in this distinction. Specific-
ally, it does not say that the source or origin of divine law
is revelation and that of human law is legitimacy or the
sovereign as the one who has the authority to legislate.
The two traditional sources of legality – a transcendent
authority or the model of command and obedience – are
absent from this definition.
The reason for these omissions is that these tradi-
tional avenues of approaching the law are not open to
Spinoza. Revelation, according to chapter 1 of the Theolo-
gical Political Treatise, is a communication with God that
is mediated through the prophets’ interpretation, which
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makes it a human construct. And the command and obed-
ience model cannot account for divine law, since God
or nature is understood in strictly impersonal terms by
Spinoza. Instead of the traditional routes of approaching
legality, Spinoza has recourse to a qualitative distinction
between the absolute necessity of divine or natural law,
and the dependence of human law on the will of a polity
to preserve itself.
The evasion of the traditional way of understanding
legality may solve Spinoza’s problem of making legality
fit his understanding of revelation, but it creates another,
serious problem. The qualitative distinction between ne-
cessity and will may be challenged on the grounds that
the human will cannot be separated in reality from the
necessity of nature. What we will and do forms part of
the concatenation of causes and effects that constitute
the totality of nature – a point forcefully argued for in
Part I of the Ethics.
To bypass this further problem, Spinoza concedes
that it appears as if we are using the word ‘law’ as it ap-
plies to nature ‘per translationem’, as a figure of speech or
as a translation, of what is commonly understood by law,
namely human law (49/58). The suggestion is that a more
rigorous (particularius) definition of the law is required,
which Spinoza promptly supplies: ‘law should be defined
… as a logic of living [ratio vivendi] that one prescribes
to oneself or to others for some end [finem]’ (49/58). The
most notable feature of this more rigorous definition is
the supposition of the use of instrumental reasoning as a
defining feature of the law. The law concerns a certain ra-
tionality in how we conduct our lives, which is concerned
with calculating the ends of our actions.
Alas, this second definition also creates more prob-
lems than it appears to solve. In particular, both the
expression ‘ratio vivendi’ and the idea of the ‘end’ (finis)
are problematic. What do they refer to? How can we un-
derstand the law as a logic of living irrespective of statute
and political authority? And how can we reconcile the
reference to ends here given Spinoza’s fierce rejection of
teleology in the appendix to Part I of the Ethics? In other
words, for an understanding of Spinoza’s second, rigor-
ous definition of the law, we need to unravel how it is
possible to understand law as broader than legitimacy as
well as how law is related to means and ends relations.3
I will take these two issues in turn by focusing on the
terms ratio vivendi and finis from the definition of the
law. I will concentrate on the first few pages of chapter
4 of the Theological Political Treatise, because it is here
that Spinoza specifically focuses on the definition of the
law. It is worth reading the opening of chapter 4 very
carefully, something which has rarely been done before.
Ratio vivendi: law and living
The term ratio vivendi in Spinoza’s definition of the law
is unusual: ‘law should be defined … as a logic of living
[ratio vivendi] that one prescribes to oneself or to others
for some end’ (49/58). This expression is not uncommon
in the Theological Political Treatise – for instance, we find
it in the title of chapter 13. But its critical use in the
definition of the law is unusual.4
There are three distinct meanings of ratio: 1) it can
be rationality or logic, as a translation of the Greek logos;
2) ratio can also mean proportion, just as in the English
ratio; and, 3) it can mean rule or regulation. In fact, the
second and third meaning are derivative of the first one:
proportion is a kind of mathematical logic and rule is the
application of rationality.5
Let us look next at how the expression ratio vivendi
is translated in the major English editions. Shirley trans-
lates ratio vivendi as ‘a rule of life’. Curley translates it
as ‘a principle of living’.6 And Israel’s edition renders
it as ‘a rule for living’.7 These translations, even if they
seem similar, in fact suggest significantly different mean-
ings to the predicate of the law. Shirley’s translation
suggests that ratio refers to some externally imposed pre-
scription; Curley’s that it denotes a universal principle;
and Israel’s that ratio is more like an instruction for the
conduct of one’s life. Thus, all these renditions of ratio
vivendi translate it in such a way as to make it amenable
only to human, not to divine law – even though Spinoza
provides a second definition that is meant to cover both.
The reason that these translations fail to include di-
vine law in the second definition is that none of these
translations entertains the possibility that ratio refers
here to rationality, which is the primary meaning of ra-
tio – and which is precisely the meaning I am trying to
convey with my translation as ‘logic of living’. The effect
of not rendering ratio vivendi in such a way as to capture
the idea that there is a logic to living, or that thought and
life – mind and body – are intertwined, is to obscure an
idea that is critical for Spinoza, namely, that there is no
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outside to the law. If the law is a ratio vivendi indicating
that there is no life without thought, then ratio vivendi is
a property not only of the law but also of human nature.
What could this strange idea entail?
If we look for other uses of ratio vivendi in chapter 4,
we note that the term and its cognates appears no less
than nine times in the three opening pages of chapter 4,
from 58 to 60 in the Gebhardt edition. Let us examine
them in sequence:
1) The first use of the term occurs at the beginning
where Spinoza asserts the distinction between divine and
human law. Spinoza highlights the necessity of divine or
natural law. Humans have no capacity to break or disobey
divine law – nor do they have a say in how it operates.
This is not the case with human law. ‘The fact that people
give up, or are compelled to give up, their natural right
and bind themselves to live under certain rationi vivendi,
depends on human will’ (48/58). Ratio vivendi refers spe-
cifically to human law or specific statutes – notice the
plural. It signifies the living arrangements that allow for
the suspension of the law.
Spinoza immediately qualifies this distinction by not-
ing that ‘in an absolute sense, all things are determined
by the universal laws of Nature’ (48), whereby it may ap-
pear that a distinction between divine and human law
is impossible. And yet, Spinoza insists on this distinc-
tion based on the transition from the monism contained
in the idea that there is nothing outside the necessity
to nature, on the one hand, to the primacy of practical
judgment, on the other. Spinoza outlines this move in
two steps. First, he argues that human law ‘depends
especially on the power of the human mind in the fol-
lowing respect, that the human mind, insofar as it is
concerned with the perception of truth and falsity’, has a
capacity which ‘can be quite clearly conceived without
these human-made laws, whereas it cannot be conceived
without Nature’s necessary law’ (48). This is the point
that we learn in Part I of the Ethics, namely, that any form
of knowledge presupposes a totality or what Spinoza calls
substance, God or nature. Second, given that there is no
usefulness in tracing every thought or every action back
to its original causes, ‘in terms of usefulness to life [ad
usum vitae] it is better, indeed, it is necessary, to consider
things as possible [possibiles]’ (49/58). In other words,
the impossibility of knowing the totality requires that
we make practical judgments.8
So, the first use of ratio vivendi refers to human law
in so far as it requires the operation of practical judg-
ment as a result of the recognition of nothing existing
outside nature or God. We already see that the standard
translation of ratio as rule in the definition of the law is
limited and it would not allow for the relation between
monism and practical judgment in the first use of ratio
vivendi in chapter 4.
2) The second use is in the definition of the law we
saw already as the ratio vivendi prescribed toward certain
ends. I will return to this definition after examining all
the remaining uses of ratio vivendi.
3) Immediately after the definition of the law,
Spinoza qualifies it by observing that such a concep-
tion of the law is obvious only to a minority whereas
most people fail to perceive it since they ‘nihil minus
quam ex ratione vivunt’ (49/59). Instead of the participle
‘vivendi’, Spinoza uses here the indicative of the verb
‘vivere’, to live. Ratio is also in a prepositional phrase
with ‘ex’ meaning according to. Here, then, Spinoza is re-
ferring to people who live with nothing like (nihil minus)
rationality. Or, more simply, most people live without
the capacity to make good practical judgments. In the
sentence immediately after the definition, then, ratio
clearly has the meaning of rationality – not that of rule.
4) Spinoza further explicates what it means for the
law when people fail to exercise their ratio properly. He
argues that since the majority do not understand the real
meaning of the law, the legislators devise an expedient
measure, namely, rewards for those following the law
and punishments for those who do not. Due to this ex-
pediency, most people have a wrong understanding of
the law as a ratio vivendi that is prescribed (praescribitur)
by a sovereignty exterior to themselves (ex aliorum im-
perio) (49/59). Thus the logic of living of the law comes to
be associated with the ‘fear of the gallows’, that is, with
the sovereign prerogative of life and death. This, how-
ever, does not make one a ‘just [justus]’ person (49/59)
because this conception of the law on the model of com-
mand and obedience is nothing but a trick or deception
on the part of those who have power. Note that Spinoza
does not outright reject this model, since it is still associ-
ated with ratio vivendi, that is, with a certain rationality
concerned with the utility of the community.9 In other
words, Spinoza is not an anti-statist, nor an anarchist.
Rather, his position is that political power (imperium or
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summa potestas) cannot possibly be the precondition of
the law. Ratio vivendi precedes legitimacy – not the other
way round.
5 and 6) All uses up to now seem to suggest that ratio
vivendi refers to human law. The fifth and sixth uses dis-
pel this impression. Here Spinoza repeats the definition
of the law (use 5) as a ratio vivendi used for a specific end,
but now specifies that this applies both to human and
divine law. It is only the end of this ratio vivendi that
changes. For human law, it is the protection of life and
the state (rempublicam), whereas for divine law it is the
knowledge of God as the only supreme good (solum sum-
mum bonum) for the human (49/59). If the definition of
the law above (in use 2) is consistent with the use here,
then we cannot possibly translate ratio as rule, since no
human rule can lead to the supreme good of Spinoza’s
divine law.
In otherwords, if both human and divine law are to be
defined on a common basis that refers to instrumentality
or utility, then ratio vivendi cannot refer to a restriction
or a compulsion of living according to specified rules.
Rather, for the human and divine law to have a common
basis, ratio here must refer to rationality concerned with
ends. I call this procedure the calculation of utility and
I will return to it in the following section. Suffice it to
say here that such a calculation may be linked to specific
rules, but only to the extent that they are useful, that is,
as effects of calculation. This means that for those who
do not understand the real meaning of the law, ratio may
be usefully misunderstood according to the command
and obedience model – as we saw above in the fourth use.
In other words, the misunderstanding of the law such as
to confine it to a model that is applicable only to human
law and that relies on command and obedience can still
perform a positive function in society– for instance, so as
to lead people to obey the law. But this misunderstand-
ing is only an expedient and not definitional of the law.
Prior to legitimacy, we have ratio as the calculation of
utility. Prior to the command model of the law, there is
practical judgment.
This priority of practical judgment shows that judg-
ments about the utility of a community precede obedi-
ence, in which case no authority has legitimacy from the
fact that it enjoys sovereignty. The priority of practical
judgment implies that no constituted power is ipso facto
legitimate, while it allows for the mobilization of utility
to contest any notion of authority. It also shows that
authority is grounded on how it justifies itself—that is, it
uses instrumental rationality to justify its actions so as
to construct its legitimacy. In short, justification precedes
legitimation.10
7, 8 and 9) Immediately after specifying that the ratio
vivendi applies both to human and to divine law, Spinoza
goes on to explain inwhat sense the divine law can be use-
ful. This consists in the perfection of our intelligence (in-
tellectus) as the means to secure our utility (utile), which
is what the supreme good consists in (49–50/59). The su-
preme good consists in recognizing ‘firstly, that without
God nothing can be or be conceived, and secondly, that
everything can be called into doubt as long as we have
no clear and distinct idea of God’ (50). In other words,
the supreme good consists in the recognition that there
is nothing outside God (or monism), which is the precon-
dition for avoiding the distracting and distressing idea
that there are deities who can intervene in the course of
nature to punish or reward us. Recognition of monism,
then, leads to the overcoming of fear and anxiety – it
leads to blessedness (beatitudo).
Spinoza summarizes his discussion of the supreme
good as follows:
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the ratio vivendi that has regard to this end [hunc finem]
[i.e. to the supreme good] can fitly be called the Divine
Law. An enquiry as to what these means [haec media]
are, and what ratio vivendi is required for this end [hic
finis], and the fundamental principles of an optimal com-
monwealth and the ratio vivendi of human relations [inter
homines] follow from it, belongs to a general treatise on
Ethics. (50/60)
Here, the supreme good that is achieved by following
the divine law is described in instrumental terms. The
means and ends are provided by the ratio vivendi that is
also responsible for good relations – social, political and
ethical – amongst human beings. The supreme good has
a ratio vivendi understood in terms of instrumentality. It
is a living that rationalises conduct according to certain
means and ends relations. Ratio vivendi as the predicate
of both divine and human law can be translated as liv-
ing under the guidance of calculating our utility or of
forming practical judgments.
Spinoza concludes the discussion of the supreme
good that can be derived from the ratio vivendi by saying
that its proper exposition belongs to a treatise on eth-
ics, that is, the Ethics whose writing Spinoza suspends
in 1665 to compose the Theological Political Treatise. If
we turn briefly to the discussion of the supreme good in
the Ethics, we will discover more about its indissoluble
relation to phronesis or practical knowledge.
In Part IV of the Ethics – that is, the part written im-
mediately after the completion of the Treatise – Spinoza
defines the supreme good (summum bonum) in Proposi-
tion 36 as follows: ‘The greatest good of those who seek
virtue is common to all, and can be enjoyed by all equally.’
The Demonstration explains that virtue is to ‘act accord-
ing to the guidance of reason’, which Spinoza supports
with reference to Proposition 24 of Part IV: ‘Acting abso-
lutely from virtue is nothing else in us but acting, living,
and preserving our being [agere, vivere, suum esse conser-
vare] (these three signify the same thing) by the guidance
of reason [ex ductu rationis], from the foundation of seek-
ing one’s own utility [utile].’ From Propositions 36 and
24, then, we can say that the supreme good is to act, live
and preserve oneself through the use of reason or ra-
tionality (ratio) insofar as ratio signifies both the virtue
and the utility of human conduct. There is a coupling,
then, of rationality and living, but the rationality here is
not directed toward adequate ideas that are universally
true but toward practical knowledge and the calculation
of one’s utility. In other words, ratio here signifies the
kind of instrumental rationality that I designate as the
calculation of utility.
But why is this calculation of one’s utility ‘enjoyed
by all equally’? Why does phronesis contributes to so-
ciality? Spinoza addresses this in Proposition 35: ‘Only
insofar asmen live according to the guidance of reason [ex
ductu rationis vivunt], must they always agree in nature.’
The demonstration relies on the principle that what ad-
vances the utility of one person contributes to the utility
of others given that rationality is common is to all. Con-
sequently, as the second Corollary puts it, ‘when each
one most seeks one’s utility for oneself, then everyone
contributes the most to everyone else’s utility.’ Or, as the
Scholium puts it more succinctly, ‘man is God to man.’11
The exercise of the calculation of one’s utility is not the
same as egoistic self-interest. Rather, a proper exercise
of the calculation of utility is a precondition of sociality.
We share common ends because the process whereby we
arrive at those ends – that is, ratio – is common to all.
The calculation of utility as a guide to living is common
to all. Nobody is excluded from ratio vivendi. And this
also means – given that ratio vivendi is the predicate of
the law – nobody is excluded from the law.
If we return now to the definition of the law, how
can we understand ratio vivendi so as to encompass all
the meanings we discovered? We can say that law is a
‘logic of living that one prescribes to oneself or to others
for some end.’ Such a logic of living is a means toward
the prosperity of both the individual and the community.
This can take two forms that are not mutually exclusive.
It can be either the blessedness that arises from monism,
or the preservation of individual life and the life of the
community that arises from human law. Ratio vivendi is,
then, irreducible to the logic of authority that appeals
to legitimacy so as to demand obedience. This does not
mean that it may not be expedient to use authority, but
authority relies on something prior to it, namely, this
ratio vivendi, that can be understood as the calculation
of utility. We will in the next section see that this cal-
culation of utility can be understood as phronesis in the
epicurean tradition in which it is regarded as the highest
good for the humans and the cause of all virtues.
Spinoza’s definition of the law in terms of the calcula-
tion of utility can be articulated as three interconnected
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ideas. First, Spinoza defines the law without recourse to a
model of command and obedience, that is, the model that
links legality with authority and legitimacy. Second, it
entails that everyone is subject to the law, since everyone
has the capacity to calculate their utility. This capacity
is enough to place everyone within legality. Or, Spinoza
rejects the possibility that one can find oneself outside
the law. Third, if everyone is subject to the law, the ac-
count of the genesis of the law no longer requires an ante-
legal or extra-legal origin, either in revelation or in some
founding violence – that is, it does not require a political
theological authority. We can understand the second
and more precise definition of the law in chapter 4 of the
Theological Political Treatise as the co-presence of these
three ideas – the rejection of the command and obedi-
ence model as definitive of legality, the recognition that
no one can be outside the law, and the anti-authoritarian
thrust of the previous two positions.
It is worth underscoring that in this definition the
calculation of utility contained in ratio is about living
or vivendi. Thus, it is about the preservation of life for
the individual and the community. It other words, in
the ratio vivendi of human law, the calculation of utility
encounters the conatus. Spinoza’s law is about living
and the pursuit of one’s most vital ends.
Finem: phronesis and the law
Ivan Sergé notes that Spinoza’s conception of the law
is incompatible with Jewish, Aristotelian, Platonic and
Stoic conceptions of legality.12 I agree, but would like to
add that this is because the definition of the law in terms
of its use and utility is distinctively epicurean. It may
appear strange to focus on the use and utility of the law
in a time where instrumentality is largely seen as a key
characteristic of neoliberalism, but we should remember
that the means and ends relations were fundamental for
a thinking of the ethical and the political for centuries –
as for instance just a glance at the title of Cicero’s most
famous ethical treatise,De finibus, testifies.13 This epi-
curean conception of the law is also incompatible with
two main conceptions of legality that we can find in polit-
ical philosophy in the last hundred years – namely, legal
positivism and decisionism. Let us start with the epicur-
ean connection before we turn to the contrast with the
prevailing theories of law.
The connection between utility, use, law and justice
is best described in Epicurus’s Principal Doctrines, a col-
lection of forty maxims or articles describing the key
ideas of epicureanism, which are preserved in Diogenes
Laertius. Articles 31 to 38 define legality in terms of util-
ity.14 Thus, article 33 says: ‘There is no absolute justice
[καθ’ ἑαυτὸ δικαιοσύνη] but only a reciprocal agreement
in specific places and times to prevent inflicting or suffer-
ing harm.’15 No justice is absolute, and hence no laws are
inviolable, because justice consist in calculating within
specific circumstances what is good and what is bad. In
article 36 Epicurus articulates the same idea in positive
terms: ‘justice is common to all [κοινὸν πᾶσιν] and it
consists in calculating the utility [συμφέρον] that con-
tributes to sociality [πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνία]; thus, de-
pending on particular conditions, justice articulates itself
differently.’16 We see in both of these citations how law
and even justice are described in terms of their use and
in particular how this use contributes to the utility of the
community.
The notions of use and utility need to be further amp-
lified, especially given that epicureanism is often under-
stood as a hedonistic doctrine that identifies pleasure as
the end of life–whereby it is often contrasted to Stoicism
that emphasizes duty.17 A closer scrutiny of the epicur-
ean texts, however, contradicts this hedonistic interpret-
ation precisely by emphasising the importance of use and
utility that are so important for Epicurus’s conception
of the law.18 Besides the law, the calculation of utility in
epicureanism is understood as a defining feature of hu-
man activity and it is inseparable from pleasure. This is
intimated in the Principal Doctrines. According to article
5, ‘it is impossible to live a life of pleasure without be-
ing prudent [φρονίμως], and without conducing oneself
ethically and justly’ – and, Epicurus immediately adds,
vice versa. This idea remains nonetheless undeveloped
in the Principal Doctrines. From the few surviving texts
by Epicurus, the greatest assistance on this connection
between use and rationality as calculation of utility or
prudence is offered by the letter to Menoeceus.
Let me quote a long passage from Epicurus’s letter to
Menoeceus to extract some insights that will be useful for
our purposes of understanding the epicurean conception
of the law:
When we say, then, that pleasure is the end of action, we
do not mean the pleasure of the prodigal or the pleasures
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of sensuality. … It is sober reasoning that calculates the
causes of every judgment to do or avoid doing something
good or harmful, and banishing those beliefs through
which the greatest tumults take possession of the soul.
Of all this the principle and the greatest good is phronesis.
Wherefore phronesis is more significant even than philo-
sophy; from it spring all the other virtues, for it teaches
that we cannot lead a life of pleasure which is not also
a life of usefulness, the good, and justice; nor lead a life
of usefulness, the good, and justice, which is not also a
life of pleasure. For the virtues have grown together with
a pleasant life, and a pleasant life is inseparable from
them.19
This is not simply a passage that blatantly contradicts
the interpretation of epicureanism as hedonism. Addi-
tionally, the emphasis on phronesis, or what I also call
above the calculation of utility, introduces a number of
ideas that are crucial to Spinoza’s epicureanism.
The first point to note is the startling predicate to
pleasure that Epicurus provides, namely ‘sober reason-
ing’. The word for reasoning here is logismos, not logos.
If logos is what has come to be understood as Reason,
logismos in the masculine or to logistikon in the neuter is
instrumental reasoning–as, for instance,Aristotlemakes
clear in the opening of BookVI of theNicomachean Ethics.
The life of pleasure requires this kind of instrumental
thinking that concentrates on means and ends.
A distinctive feature of this instrumental reasoning
is that it posits the inseparability of mind and body – it
is, as Epicurus says, the absence of pain in the body and
of anxiety in the soul.20 This is the same point raised in
article 33 of the Principal Doctrines cited above, according
to which justice aims to prevent harm. This instrumental
reasoning is prominent in all the epicureans of the seven-
teenth century. For instance, Spinoza puts it as follows
in the Ethics: ‘From the guidance of reason, we pursue [ex
rationis ductu sequemur] the greater of two goods or the
lesser of two evils’.21 Spinoza immediately explains that
this calculative or instrumental reasoning is not confined
to the present but also includes the future in its consid-
erations.22 In any case, the point I am making is that
this logismos is not abstract or theoretical reasoning but
rather a practical kind of reasoning that entrains ends
and considers action.
When Epicurus writes that this practical reasoning is
more significant than philosophy, he is pointing to a re-
versal of Aristotle’s position. According to Book VI of the
Nicomachean Ethics, theoretical reason leads to wisdom
and virtue more than practical reason. When discuss-
ing the priority of theoretical over practical reason in the
Nicomachean Ethics, Heidegger notes that this is the start-
ing point of metaphysics and onto-theology.23 We see
Epicurus here evading that move. For him, the primary
kind of knowledge is practical and it is articulated in the
form of judgments that are calculations about pleasure
– that is, calculations that combine ratiocination with
considerations about the body.
Epicurus designates this practical, instrumental judg-
ment as phronesis. This is the standard Greek name for
this practical knowledge that he describes here. What is
unusual in Epicurus is that he makes phronesis the pre-
condition of both the good and of virtue. Such a move is
indicative of his materialism–of the fact that knowledge
is not abstract but rather articulated through its effects
and how it impacts on the corporeal order of things. It is
the fact that– to use a contemporary formulation–know-
ledge is power. The suggestion that the good and virtue
require phronesis is a bold one. Phronesis is a judgment
that arises by assessing – or, calculating – one’s given
circumstances. Because it is a response to materiality,
phronesis can never aspire to a thorough formalisation.
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Materiality is contingent and hence unthematisable. Any
calculation in relation to materiality is faced with its in-
eluctable unpredictability. Spinoza is fully cognisant of
this point and he embraces its positive potential. As I
argue elsewhere, the notion of error is constitutive of his
understanding of politics and of history. The seeming
deficiency of phronesis – the fact that it has no steadfast
rules to prove its validity or that it has to think ‘without
banisters’ – is turned into a positive heuristic principle
by Spinoza.24
Neither positivism nor decisionism
I have dwelled on this passage from the letter to Men-
oeceus because it brings to the fore a key idea that is
critical for Spinoza’s definition of the law, namely, that
the law is to be understood in terms of its use, which
consists in how it facilitates the people’s calculation of
their utility or exercise of phronesis.
It is noteworthy that Giorgio Agamben in The Highest
Poverty identifies a tradition that interrogates the law
in terms of its use. This is the tradition of communal
use in the Franciscan tradition. There is a key difference,
however, from the epicurean tradition that I have desig-
nated as the source of Spinoza’s conception of legality.
For the epicureans, use is definitional of the law. For
Agamben, by contrast, the Franciscan conception of use
delineates an extra-legal space. For instance, he writes
that ‘the juridical argumentation is here [that is, in the
context of referring to use] bent on opening a space out-
side the law.’25 Whereas use pertains to jurisprudence
through its exclusion from the law, according to Agam-
ben, use pertains to jurisprudence because it is internal
to the law by indicating the limits of legality, according
to epicureanism and Spinoza.26
Despite this contrast, Agamben’s starting principle
that ‘Western philosophy lacks even the most elementary
principles’ of what he terms ‘a theory of use’ is nonethe-
less sound.27 We can demonstrate this by comparing two
dominant ways in which the law has been conceived in
the Western tradition to contrast them briefly with the
epicurean conception of the law. First, we can identify
legal positivism. I do not want to be distracted here by
the various views expressed within this school of juris-
prudence, starting with John Austin in the nineteenth
century before being further developed by Hans Kelsen
in Austria and H.L.A. Hart in England in the following
century. I just want to point out one key feature of this
tradition, namely, that law needs to be understood as
a system that is closed. Thus, Hart in his The Concept
of Law (1961), which is a sustained attempt to define
the law, rejects any view that conflates legal with moral
norms, or that does not draw a clear line of separation
from social factors.28 Such a conception of the law as
a closed system is incompatible with any definition of
the law in terms of living, as in Spinoza’s definition in
chapter 4 of the Theological Political Treatise.
Second, one of the major critics of legal positivism—
or more precisely, Kelsen’s legal positivism—in the twen-
tieth century was Carl Schmitt, whose influence in polit-
ical philosophy has been powerful, especially in the last
couple of decades. Unlike the positivists, Schmitt holds
that the system of law can never be self-sufficient. Thus,
he famously defines the sovereign as the one who decides
on the exception. The law, according to Schmitt, lacks
legitimacy in itself. Instead, the law requires the pres-
ence of a sovereign who has the capacity to transcend
the law within specific circumstances of emergency.29
Contra Schmitt, the epicurean conception of law as use
rejects any notion of transcendence and it is decidedly
anti-authoritarian requiring no recourse to a strong no-
tion of sovereignty.
I have noted legal positivism and decisionism be-
cause they seem to form the antinomy upon which cur-
rent political philosophy thinks the law, namely either
as a closed system or as something that requires a strong
personal political authority, given the impossibility of co-
difying every aspect of life. This antinomy is not so much
mediated as entirely evaded by the epicurean definition
of the law in terms of its use and utility. If the law is a
logic of living, then the law is positioned prior to any
codification, irrespective of whether that codification is
understood as complete or incomplete.
If the epicurean conception of the law avoids the
conflict between positivism and decisionism, then why
has it not been taken up more vigorously in the theor-
ies of jurisprudence? What has it never been explicitly
articulated? This is a speculative question, and as such
it may have several answers, including the historical de-
velopment of theories of the law, which excludes the
epicurean theory. Nonetheless, there is an additional
insight that is pertinent and significant, namely, the rad-
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ical implication of an understanding of law in terms of
use and utility contained in article 38 of the Principal
Doctrines: ‘the laws are just so long as they contribute to
the utility of those living in a political community [τῶν
συμπολιτευομένων], and when they cease to be expedi-
ent they are consequently not just.’30 The implication
here is clear: the legitimacy of the law does not rely on
its statutes, nor on a political authority, but rather on
the utility of the law for the community. In other words,
so long as the law is not useful, it is no longer valid.
The same implication is contained in the definition
of the law as having a certain logic of living that is dir-
ected toward a certain end. This end is the good and
prosperity of the community. According to Spinoza, fol-
lowing the epicurean tradition, the law is invalidated as
soon as this end disappears. Let me provide a couple of
examples of this point.
In chapter 12 of the Theological Political Treatise,
Spinoza returns to the divine law to examine in what
sense we can say that it is sacred. Consistent with the
definition of the law in chapter 4, Spinoza asserts that
the sacredness of the divine law consists in its use. One
of the illustrations of his point is the Tablets Moses car-
ried when he descended from Mount Sinai the first time
only to find the Hebrews venerating the golden calf. Ac-
cording to Spinoza, the Tablets were sacred only to the
extent that ‘on them was inscribed the Covenant under
which the Jews had bound themselves to obey God.’ But
as soon as they started venerating the golden calf, they
chose not to use the ‘covenant [pactum]’, whereby the tab-
lets became useless and thus ‘merely stones’ (147/161).
Use is more important than both revelation and a pur-
ported completeness of statute in defining the law. The
law requires an end that is to be found within the lived
experience of those it affects.
If we turn to chapter 20, Spinoza defends the position
that everyone should be allowed to judge freely about
matters pertaining to the running of the state as well as
to express these judgments, but without acting to oppose
the sovereign. He notes, at the same time, that ‘nothing
is more unbearable [nihil magis impatienter]’ (226/244)
than when people know what they are judging to be true
and when they notice that the sovereign ignores this
and consistently acts in such a way as to further his self-
interest or harm the utility of the polity. For this reason,
Spinoza adds, in a democracy people retain ‘the authority
to abrogate [auctoritatem… abrogandi]’ (228/245). This
kind of authority is the opposite of the sovereign prerog-
ative to decide on the exception. Whereas the sovereign
decision reinforces a personal authority that transcends
the law, the authority to abrogate is the assertion of the
uselessness of certain laws and hence of their relevance
to a polity only insofar as they are useful.
What is the use of use?
Let me conclude with a few brief remarks that consider
the importance of the epicurean conception of the law
according to its use that Spinoza employs in the defin-
ition of the law in chapter 4 of the Theological Political
Treatise. How can such a theory be useful today?
An initial observation concerns how provocative
Spinoza’s predicate of the law as a ratio vivendi appears
in a biopolitical era in which the main business of gov-
ernment is to manage life – as opposed to the classical
sovereign power that has the right to exercise capital
punishment.31 On the one hand, Spinoza’s definition
suggests that there is no pure life as such. Living is al-
ways imbuedwith a certain ratio–with a certain logic and
a determined system of rules. No one can be a ‘bare life’
that is excluded from legality. On the other hand, this
does not need to lead to a despair about how biopower
completely controls our lives. To the contrary, it becomes
the basis for examining the way that power is exercised
because it allows for the repeal of any laws or regulations
that are no longer contributing to our utility.
A second point to note is that scholars have noted the
function of use in jurisprudence, even if this has not been
explicitly thematized. For instance, this is the case in the
way that property has been defined in the colonial pro-
ject. One of the key concepts that justified colonisation
was the legal principle of terra nullius. The idea was that
uncultivated lands, that is, lands that are in ‘disuse’, are
not legally owned and hence they can be claimed by colo-
nial power.32 As Brenna Bhandar argues, the concept of
use was mobilized by colonial authorities to create legal
definitions of property that were both racially tinted and
justifications of the appropriation of native land.33 This
shows the danger of a principle of use: it can be moulded
in such a way as to suit established power – it can be a
weapon in the service of ‘the right of the strongest’.
At the same time, as Bhandar further argues in Colo-
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nial Lives of Property, the ‘fundamental paradox’ of use
is that many indigenous land claims also rely on the
concept of use.34 For a native title claim to succeed in
a court of law, native people need to demonstrate that
they used and continue to make use of their land. The
notion of use may be adapted from its native conception
to that of the jurisdiction of the court that is designed
to defend ownership and the use of land in settler so-
ciety, but in any case the key term is ‘use.’ The most
famous example of this in Australia is the Mabo ruling
that upheld the claim of native title.35 Significant work
has also been done to challenge colonial understandings
of the use of land. For instance, Bruce Pascoe’s Dark Emu
shows that, far from being ‘uncultivated’, Australian ab-
original peoples had sedentary communities that had
developed sophisticated systems of agriculture.36 Again,
the challenge to colonialism here consists in employing
the concept of use.
A third implication arises at this point. It is possible
to mobilise this idea of use as law-defining to determine
a number of political concepts that are inseparable from
legality. In my book Sovereignty and its Other, I define
sovereignty, for instance, through the way in which con-
stituted power uses justifications of violence against its
‘others’, that is, against anyone who is not part of that
constituted power.37 I argue that neither a decisionist
conception of sovereignty in terms of the exception to the
norm, nor a positivist definition in terms of legal norms,
is sufficient to demonstrate the ways in which sovereign
power is exercised and how its effects are registered.
Let me be clear: I am not simply advocating that we
need to redefine post factum law and cognate concepts
in terms of use. Rather, I am suggesting that, despite the
fact that there has been no explicit articulation of the law
in terms of use in jurisprudence – as I noted above – in
fact the law has operated implicitly with such a sense of
use. The law has been used with an eye to use, usefulness
and utility, as the examples from the colonial definitions
of property or of the sovereign justification of violence
demonstrate. Thus, what I am suggesting is a revision
that departs from the material use of the law – its ‘un-
dercurrent’ use as Althusser might have said – instead
of its explicitly stated definition or determination. This
will lead to a materialist way of understanding the law.
Spinoza and the epicureans can be useful allies in such a
project.
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